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In recognition  of the  severe  consequences  of the  recent  international  ﬁnancial  crisis, the  topic  of macro-
prudential  policy  has  elicited  considerable  research  effort.  The  present  study  constructs,  for  46 economies
around  the  globe,  an  index  of  the  capacity  to deploy  macroprudential  policies.  Building  on elements  that
have  been  the  subject  of  recent  research,  we develop  an  index  that  aims  to  represent  the  essence  of
what  constitutes  a  macroprudential  regime.  Speciﬁcally,  the index  quantiﬁes:  (1)  how  existing  macro-
prudential  frameworks  are  organized;  and  (2)  how  far a  particular  jurisdiction  is  from  reaching  the
goals  established  by  the  Group  of Twenty  (G20)  and  the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB).  The  latter  is a
benchmark  that  has  not  been  considered  in  the  burgeoning  literature  that seeks  to  quantify  the role  of
macroprudential  policies.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).eywords:
entral banks
inancial stability board
ndex
acroprudential policy
olicy framework
. IntroductionIn the past several years a considerable amount of research effort
as been devoted to the topic of macroprudential policy. While
he term ‘macroprudential’ apparently dates back to the 1970s
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ita Ricardo Campbell National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
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572-3089/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(Barwell, 2013), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) cham-
pioned the push for macroprudential regulation as of last decade
(e.g., Borio and White, 2004). One of the early supporters of the
development of a macroprudential framework, Andrew Crockett,
former General Manager of the BIS, put it in the following terms:
“Strengthening the macro-prudential orientation of the regulatory
and supervisory framework is important because of the costs and
nature of ﬁnancial instability. The main costs take the form of
output losses. The nature of the processes generating instability
puts a premium on a macro-prudential conception of economic
behaviour” (Crockett, 2012).
In contrast to the management and staff of the BIS, most active
policy makers and academics made few references to macropru-
dential regulation until the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) of 2008-9.
The unexpected interconnections, vulnerabilities, and contagion
that marked the crisis underscored the fundamental importance of
developing comprehensive macroprudential policy regimes. Yet,
more than seven years after the crisis, the meaning of the term
‘macroprudential regulation’ remains “obscure” (Barwell, 2013), its
motivation is imperfectly understood (e.g., Claessens, 2014), and
its effectiveness is still much debated (e.g., Galati and Moessner,
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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incorporates ﬁnancial frictions. Time-varying capital requirements,
which serve as a macroprudential instrument can be stabilizing
under certain circumstances. In particular, knowing the source6 D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal
014). Although Kevin Warsh, a former member of the US Fed-
ral Open Market Committee (FOMC), referring to macroprudential
olicy, remarked in 2014 that “There remains precious little eco-
omic literature and policy practice to provide informed guidance”
Galati and Moessner, 2014, pg. 77), over the past couple of years
here has been a surge of theoretical and empirical studies on the
ubject. Nevertheless, there is still little agreement on the ingre-
ients of a macroprudential policy framework, unlike the case of
onetary policy where there is greater consensus on what deﬁnes,
or example, an inﬂation targeting regime. The principal motiva-
ion of this paper is to identify some key empirical indicators of the
urrent state of the macroprudential framework in each of the 46
conomies under review, and to make a preliminary assessment
f whether they are empirically linked to the macroeconomic and
nancial variables that are commonly seen as closely associated
ith maintaining ﬁnancial stability.
Researchers and policy makers confront several challenges in
ackling the subject. First, unlike monetary policy, which can be
xplained or summarized via rules of thumb such as the Tay-
or rule (Taylor, 1993), there is nothing that comes close to a
ule-based reaction function for implementing macroprudential
olicies. Indeed, it seems that this form of policy making is the
ntithesis of following clear cut policy rules, especially since macro-
rudential policies need to be designed to operate asymmetrically
n the upswing and downswing of the ﬁnancial cycle (McDonald,
015). To illustrate the intricacy of the macroprudential state of
lay, consider the ‘alphabet soup’ of programs the ﬁnancial crisis
roduced in attempting to mitigate ﬁnancial system-wide distress
viz., TARP, LSAP, QE, OMT, FLS, to name just a few).1
Second, burdening established policymaking institutions in
ach country with new macroprudential responsibilities confronts
he well-founded concern, expressed long ago by Brainard (1967),
hat one ought to be conservative in deploying new policy instru-
ents that could have unintended consequences. The objective
f monetary stability is to preserve the purchasing power of the
omestic currency by ensuring that prices are relatively stable. The
bjective of ﬁnancial stability, however, is to ensure that the com-
lexity and interconnectedness of the ﬁnancial system, and the
endency for ﬁnancial market behaviour to create ﬁnancial boom
nd bust patterns, do not produce large negative externalities for
he real economy.
Third, attempts by global institutions such as the Financial
tability Board (FSB) to implement comprehensive assessments,
nalyses, and regulatory proposals, with the objective of reining
n the ﬁnancial system’s tendency to create recurring crises, cre-
tes complexity that makes it more challenging for policy makers
o communicate how they intend to stabilize the world ﬁnan-
ial system. If the objectives are unclear, and the means through
hich they are to be attained are problematic, then communication
ecomes extremely difﬁcult. Nevertheless, these developments
lso highlight that an evaluation of the effectiveness of macro-
rudential policies involves a mix  of institutional, economic, and
nancial elements.
The present study is an effort to provide, for 46 economies,2 an
mpirical index of the capacity to deploy macroprudential policies.
ur aim is to quantify how existing macroprudential frameworks
re organized by incorporating indicators of how far a particular
urisdiction is from meeting the goals set by the FSB and the Group
1 TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) and LSAP (Large Scale Asset Purchases)
y the US Fed and Treasury; QE (quantitative easing) and OMT (Outright Monetary
ransactions) by the European Central Bank; and FFL (Funding for Lending) by the
ank of England.
2 The economies covered by our analysis include a mix  of advanced and emerging
arket economies. A complete list shown in Table 2a.ncial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49
of Twenty (G20). We  believe this benchmark has been largely over-
looked in the literature until now.
Our proposed index also includes several other elements that
are relevant for assessing the capacity of policy makers to deliver
effective macroprudential policies. These elements include: (1) the
availability of macroprudential instruments, (2) the speciﬁcation of
the ﬁnancial stability mandate, and (3) the division of institutional
responsibilities between the central bank and other agencies. It is
important to note, however, that the aggregate index of these fac-
tors is intended to capture the existence of this policy framework;
we do not attempt to evaluate how effective the framework is likely
to be in maintaining ﬁnancial stability – that will only be possible
after these frameworks have been in place for a period of time (e.g.,
also see Masciandaro and Volpicella, 2016).
Our work is in the vein of recent attempts, for example, by Lim
et al. (2013b), to evaluate the impact of macroprudential policies.
However, unlike their empirical measure, ours is broader in scope
and takes into account more explicitly the work done by the FSB.
Moreover, while the economies that were most impacted by the
GFC tend to have made relatively more progress in responding to
macroprudential concerns, so have others not directly impacted by
the crisis. Hence, while, as in Lim et al. (2013b), macroprudential
policies can be country-speciﬁc, there is a global element that must
not be ignored.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion provides a literature survey. As the extant literature covers
a wide variety of topics, we focus on issues that are most germane
to the paper.3 In Section 3 we  detail our attempt to develop an
empirical index of the components of a macroprudential regula-
tory framework, and a ranking for the 46 economies as of January
2015 concerning their readiness, both institutionally and relative
to the criteria established by the G20 and the FSB, to meet the
attendant ﬁnancial risks they faced. Section 4 discusses the ver-
sions of our index that we estimate and reports our key ﬁndings.
Based on the results for this indicator we  then illustrate empiri-
cally, in a cross-sectional setting, how our index correlates with
some macro, ﬁnancial and institutional measures routinely used in
the relevant literature. Our key conclusion from this cross-sectional
work is that credit growth is a signiﬁcant determinant of the capac-
ity of the existing macroprudential framework. Section 5 concludes
and offers some policy implications.
2. Literature review
Put simply, macroprudential policy is intended to assist with
the maintenance of ﬁnancial stability.4 Financial stability requires
two ingredients (e.g., Galati and Moessner, 2011): the ﬁnancial sys-
tem must be robust to external shocks (e.g. Allen and Wood, 2006;
Padoa-Schioppa, 2003); and it must be resilient to shocks originat-
ing from within the ﬁnancial system (Houben et al., 2004), and to
“normal-sized” shocks (Borio and Drehman, 2009). For example,
this motivates Angelini et al. (2014) to extend a DSGE model that3 Barwell (2013) is a comprehensive account of the origins, development, and
theoretical aspects dealing with macroprudential policies, although it leans towards
the UK perspective (see below). More general surveys that examine the motivation
and deployment of macroprudential policies to date include Claessens (2014) and
Galati and Moessner (2011, 2014).
4 The online Appendix provides examples of how different central banks deﬁne
the concept of ﬁnancial system stability. Galati and Moessner (2011) point out that
since 2008, usage of the term “macroprudential” in speeches by central bankers
(e.g.,  Shirakawa, 2009; Kohn, 2009) has risen markedly, paralleling a sharp rise in
academic research.
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f the economic shock is critical as is the degree of cooperation
etween monetary policy and the goal of ﬁnancial system stabil-
ty. Ghilardi and Peiris (2016) adopt a similar framework but are
nterested in how capital ﬂows to emerging market economies
an prevent ﬁnancial instability also through the application of a
acroprudential instrument.
As Carney (see Yueh, 2015), among others, has pointed out that
heory has yet to catch up with practice in the conduct of macropru-
ential policies, there have, of course, been some recent important
ontributions (e.g., see Freixas et al., 2015; Leduc and Natal 2015,
nd also Bank of England, 2009, 2015). Nevertheless, our concern
s with an empirical evaluation of the characteristics of existing
acroprudential regimes at the present time.
Only two studies, to our best knowledge, have attempted to
uantify macroprudential policy frameworks. Lim et al. (2013b)
ank institutional set-ups on an integer scale from 1 to 4, based on
he respective roles of central banks and governments in macro-
rudential regulation.5 The authors conclude that small open
conomies tend to have a more integrated approach, with the
entral bank ordinarily the competent authority, while more com-
lex economies leave a larger role for the government. They also
nd that a uniﬁed framework – where a single institution has the
rimary responsibility for the objective of ﬁnancial stability – is
ore likely to employ macroprudential policy instruments than
re frameworks that require coordination among several separate
ational or supranational agencies with distinct ﬁnancial stability-
elated mandates.
Cerutti et al. (2015) create a time series indicator of the effective-
ess of known macroprudential tools in dampening credit cycles
or 119 countries from 2000 to 2013.6 The authors ﬁnd that macro-
rudential tools are effective at reducing credit growth, but their
ffectiveness varies by instrument, by country, and the state of the
redit cycle. Prior to the GFC, it is almost certainly questionable
hether the tools apparently available were primarily intended to
eal with macroprudential concerns as they are understood today.
Our own indicator is broader in scope than extant ones and,
nlike Lim et al. (2013b) or Cerutti et al. (2015), takes explicit
ccount of efforts by the FSB to establish some common rules of con-
uct and metrics that countries are expected to use in fashioning a
acroprudential framework.7 We  also make extensive use of gov-
rnance information collected by us and the BIS as this is a critical,
hough unsettled, element in designing a macroprudential frame-
ork (also see Masciandaro and Volpicella, 2016). Nevertheless,
e conclude, as did Cerutti et al. (2015), that there exists a robust
mpirical link between macroprudential framework capacity and
redit growth.
The central bank’s role may  vary from being a member of
 macroprudential policy board (such as the Financial Stability
versight Council in the US), to providing the analytical basis for
onitoring systemic risks (such as in the case of the European
entral Bank), to being the single entity responsible for macropru-
5 Other attempts at creating indexes for speciﬁc applications (i.e., applied to hous-
ng or a particular region of the globe) include Kuttner and Shim (2013) and Zhang
nd Zoli (2014). Lim et al. (2013a) focus on current practices in Asia. The index is an
ggregation of the following characteristics: who is in charge of macroprudential
olicy, the role of government in the framework, decision-making and control over
acroprudential instruments, and whether a coordinating body exists to carry out
acroprudential policies.
6 Theirs is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of 12 macroprudential instru-
ents based on the timing and use of these instruments and their connection to
redit growth developments in the economies investigated.
7 Though only for 19 economies. These data apply to G20 members only. Also,
orrelations between the Lim et al. (2013b) or Cerutti et al. (2015) indexes and ours
re small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Details are available from an unpublished
ppendix.ncial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49 37
dential analysis and policy implementation (as in the case of the
Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand).
There is potentially a high degree of interaction between macro-
prudential and monetary policy. Both inﬂuence the supply and
demand of credit and risk appetites (IMF, 2013b). For example,
looser monetary policy may, over time, create an incentive for both
borrowers and lenders to become more leveraged, which creates
vulnerabilities to adverse shocks (Adrian and Liang, 2014). Cen-
tral banks are typically also at the forefront in combatting ﬁnancial
crises.
A potential counterargument for assigning a ﬁnancial stabil-
ity goal to the central bank is that it can weaken perceptions of
the commitment to price stability, and thus destabilize inﬂation
expectations (Agénor and da Silva, 2014). Moreover, there is a risk,
unless the lines of authority between elected and appointed ofﬁ-
cials are laid out precisely, that macroprudential policies can appear
to be politically motivated or draw the central bank into the realm
of distributive policies, both of which are frowned upon by sup-
porters of the principles of central bank autonomy and democratic
accountability (e.g., Goodfriend, 2012; Tucker, 2014b).
Various operational structures for monetary and macropruden-
tial policy have been discussed in the literature. Macroprudential
policy targets particular sectors through a granular approach
(Schoenmaker, 2014) whereas monetary policy is often regarded
as a blunt instrument for pursuing ﬁnancial stability (e.g.,
Eichengreen et al., 2011). Hence, macroprudential and monetary
policy should work independently of one another (Goodhart, 2014,
also see Tucker, 2014a). There are indeed strong complementarities
between monetary and macroprudential policies (e.g., IMF, 2013a),
and monetary policy can play an important role in addressing
the “procyclicality” of the ﬁnancial system (Borio and Drehmann,
2009). Critics argue, however, that this approach may, on average,
produce tighter monetary policy (Agur and Demertzis, 2012).
Alternatively, cooperation may  be preferred. Monetary policy
and macroprudential policy are interdependent, and a compromise
may  be required should macroprudential policies run into political
constraints or lobbying pressures (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Portes
2014). Furthermore, macroprudential policy tools should be sufﬁ-
ciently different from the tools used by the monetary authority as
to prevent coordination problems among policy-makers (De Paoli
and Paustian, 2013). The role of cooperation between policy mak-
ers is also at the heart of the model developed by Angelini et al.
(2014).
The ‘coordinated’ approach brings relevant authorities (e.g.,
central banks and banking supervisors) together in a coopera-
tive agreement (in the form of a policy board or memoranda of
understanding) with the aim of achieving ﬁnancial stability by
relying on each institution’s respective instruments and expertise
(Eichengreen et al., 2011). In contrast, the ‘single entity’ approach
entrusts one institution with multiple mandates and various instru-
ments with which to achieve them.
The coordinated approach can lead to conﬂicting opinions and
strategies (Ingves, 2011), and a central bank, which is typically
independent from government and other institutions, may  not
look favourably on coordinating its policies with other institutions.
There are also potentially some governance drawbacks from the
coordinated approach: it may  weaken accountability if authorities
can divert responsibility, it may  also increase the risk of inac-
tion (Knot, 2014; Ingves, 2011), and there is always the risk of
inter-agency rivalries or conﬂicting mandates getting in the way
of coordinated action on perceived risks to ﬁnancial stability.
The single-entity approach has some advantages. It creates clar-
ity of responsibility in identifying risks and implementing policies
(IMF, 2011), and is administratively simple and cost-minimizing
(Anand et al., 2014). Furthermore, it serves to eliminate regulatory
gaps and ensure policy consistency, thereby reducing regulatory
38 D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal of Financial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49
Table  1a
Macroprudential Capacity Indicator: Categories.
Section Categories Description Sign of the
contribution
to the indicator
Weight
1 Implementing Macroprudential
Policy: The Constituents of
Financial System Stability
Includes information about central bank’s authority to implement
macroprudential instruments, availability of instruments to the
central bank, ﬂexibility to implement macroprudential type policies.
+ 0.20
2  Coordination of Relevant Entities &
Responsibility for Macroprudential
Policy: Central Bank vs.  Relevant
Entities
Speciﬁcs regarding coordinating body and entities sharing the
ﬁnancial stability mandate. Includes number of members, chair, and
central bank’s involvement. Also includes central bank’s ‘recognition’
of  ﬁnancial stability, i.e.  explicit deﬁnition and/or inclusion of mandate
in  legislation (or elsewhere).
+ 0.25
3  Deposit Insurance Deposit insurance details (if applicable), savings limit, % coverage, etc.  + 0.05
4  Transparency & Accountability:
Speeches, Media Releases,
Financial Stability Reports
Captures relevance of macroprudential regulation and ﬁnancial
stability as measured through speeches with topics as a main focus.
Also includes ﬁnancial stability report details, including size of
macroprudential ‘section’ if applicable.
+ 0.10
5  Governance of Macroprudential
Policy: Changes of Central Bank
Organization Structure Since the
Crisis
Size of the policy making committee and number of layers
(departments/levels in the central bank and place of ﬁnancial stability
in  the organization).
+ 0.10
6  Place of Macroprudential Policy in
the Monetary Policy Transmission
Mechanism
Captures any publicly recognized (by central bank) relationship
between monetary policy and macroprudential regulation. Includes (if
applicable) relationship with ﬁnancial stability, inﬂation, and real
economic growth.
+ 0.05
7  Distance to FSB/G20
Recommendations
Taken from FSB/G20 surveys of national progress. Measures
‘improvements’ in macroprudential regulation as per survey
questions. Speciﬁcally regarding regulatory framework, monitoring,
and supervisor/central bank cooperation.
+ 0.15
8  Response Time to FSB/G20
Recommendations
Overall estimate of response time to recommendations (taken from
surveys of national progress).
− 0.10
Sources: See Appendix. FSB is the Financial Stability Board; G20 is the Group of 20 economies.
Notes:  (refer to section numbers above): 1. A higher value indicates greater capacity due to the availability of more instruments, greater autonomy for the central bank to
implement macroprudential policy, and more formality in the assignment of responsibility for macroprudential policy; 2. Using the FSB/G20 benchmarks, a higher value
implies  a smaller distance to the stated objectives; 3. Based on 11 different areas of ﬁnancial stability, and using 2008 as the benchmark year (the year the Global Financial
Crisis  erupted) we  subtracted 2008 from the year of completion of a reform (if available) and then average over all the areas identiﬁed by the FSB/G20; 4. The higher the value
the  greater the capacity since this indicates that areas of responsibility are clearer and more formally assigned; 5. Presence of deposit insurance indicates greater resilience
as  well as time for policy makers to respond to large ﬁnancial shocks; 6. Recognition that there is interconnectedness between monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability is seen
as  an indication of greater central bank capacity to deal with macroprudential questions; 7. Greater transparency and accountability is viewed as conducive and evidence
of  greater central bank capacity in macroprudential policy; 8. Expansion in organizational capacity, measured by the size of the committee(s) dealing with both monetary
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place in central banks by 2015.10 Since many central banks have
acquired more responsibilities over ﬁnancial stability since the GFC
we are interested in incorporating this feature into the index. A
8 A detailed spreadsheet containing the data, and tables giving the index values
for  each country for each category separately, is available as an online appendix.
9 Within the different groups listed in Tables 1a and 1b, group one has 4 elements
and  a highest observed value of 11, group two  has 11 elements and a highest value of
16.5,  group three has 1 element and a highest value of 1, group four has 6 elementsolicy and ﬁnancial stability issues and the addition of levels of authority in the cen
rbitrage (Anand et al., 2014; see also Pan, 2010). However, the
entral bank is not suitable to be the uniﬁed authority in all cases.
ndeed the ﬁnancial regulatory environment is a very complex sys-
em, and central banks across policy jurisdictions have extensive
anges of responsibilities, powers and trade-offs (Ingves, 2011).
ince there is no resolution to this debate this feature is reﬂected
n our index, to which we now turn.
. Macroprudential capacity index: composition and
eﬁnitions
Our proposed index incorporates over 30 elements consid-
red to be part of a macroprudential framework. We  allocate
hem to eight categories: (1) the authority the central bank
as in carrying out macroprudential policies; (2) the number
f entities responsible for the maintenance of ﬁnancial stabil-
ty and their mandates; (3) the existence of a deposit insurance
cheme; (4) the degree of transparency and accountability in
he macroprudential regime; (5) the governance of the macro-
rudential framework; (6) how resorting to macroprudential
nstruments inﬂuences the monetary policy transmission mech-
nism; (7) how far the current macroprudential regime is from
he FSB/G20 recommendations (timeliness and responsiveness to
egulatory reforms); and (8) how quickly policy makers respond
o the need to implement FSB/G20 measures intended to ensure
nancial system stability. Below, we discuss each grouping in
urn.ank is viewed as an indication of greater capacity.
Table 1a provides a description of the contents of the eight cate-
gories used in deﬁning the index.8 With one exception (see Table 1a
above) the index is designed such that a rise in the value of a
component implies an increased capacity of the macroprudential
framework. Table 1b provides the coding details of each element
across the eight categories that are aggregated to produce the index.
Table 2a provides a variety of versions of the index. Some versions
are restricted to FSB member countries (i.e., G20 economies), and
others are sensitive to whether we include changes in governance
structures since the GFC.
The benchmark index values shown in Table 2a are
unweighted.9 One version of the index considers what hap-
pens when we exclude organizational changes that had takenand a highest value of 3, group ﬁve has 5 elements and a highest value of 10, group
six  has 1 element and a highest value of 1, group seven has 3 elements and a highest
value of 3.5 and group eight has one element and a highest value of 6.
10 This is the most recent year when the BIS collected central bank organigrams at
the  time of writing.
D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal of Financial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49 39
Table  1b
Macroprudential Capacity Indicator: Coding.
Categories Description YES NO Other
Implementing
Macroprudential
Policy: The
Constituents of
Financial System
Stability
Number of macroprudential instruments possessed and
declared by the CB
#
Is the CB free to implement available macroprudential
instruments?
1 0
Is  there government involvement in macroprudential
instrument-related decisions?
0 1
Macroprudential Implementation speciﬁed in primary,
secondary legislation, or regulation?
Pri = 1, Sec = .5,
Regu. = .25, Oth  = 0
Coordination of
Relevant Entities &
Responsibility for
Macroprudential Policy
Is CB the explicitly mentioned macroprudential authority? 1 0
Is  macroprudential explicitly in CB legislation? 1 0
Is  there a ﬁnancial stability/macroprudential coordinating
body?
1 0
#  (voting) members #
...  # non-voting members # / 2
Is  the CB a member? 1 0
Does CB chair coordination body? 1 0
If  no body – Does CB share ﬁnancial stability/macroprudential
mandate?
1 0
If  no body – Is CB sole owner of the mandate? 0 1
If  no body – is there implicit coordination through MoUs? 0.5 0
If  no body – ...how many in total share? (including CB) # / 2
Is  ﬁnancial stability explicitly the responsibility of the CB? 1 0
...explicit in CB legislation? 1 0 Indirect cases: 0.5
Does  the CB have an explicit deﬁnition of ﬁnancial stability? 1 0
YES? In the legislation? 1 0
Elsewhere? 0.5 0
Deposit Insurance Is there deposit insurance? 1 0
Transparency and
Accountability
Going back to 2008, # of Speeches with ‘Macroprudential’ in
Title
# / 12
Going back to 2008, # of Press Releases with ‘Macroprudential’
in Title
# / 12
Does the Central Bank publish a separate Financial Stability
Report?
1 0
...is  there a section explicitly devoted to macroprudential
policy?
0.5 0
Does an authority other than the Central Bank publish a
separate Financial Stability Report?
0.5 0
...is  there a section explicitly devoted to macroprudential
policy?
0.25 0
Organization Structure:
Changes Since the
Crisis
Number of monetary policy committee members (if
applicable)
#
Number of ﬁnancial stability committee members (if
applicable)
#
Is there a separate ﬁnancial stability committee? 1 0
Change in # “major” departments based on the available
organizational charts since 2001*
#
Change in # “major” departments based on the available
organizational charts since 2011**
#
Is there a distinct ﬁnancial stability department? 1 0
If  so, is it on the same ‘level’ as department responsible for
monetary policy?
1 0
Does it report to the same deputy governor? 1 0
Place  of Macroprudential
Policy in the Monetary Policy
Transmission Mechanism
Does the CB draw a link/links between Monetary Policy and
Macroprudential Policy?
1 0
Distance to FSB/G20
Recommendations
Regulatory Framework for macroprudential Oversight Pri = 1, Sec = .5,
Regu = .25, Oth = 0
System-wide monitoring and the use of macroprudential
instruments
Pri = 1, Sec = .5,
Regu = .25, Oth=0
Improved cooperation between supervisors and central banks Pri = 1, Sec = .5,
Regu = .25, Oth = 0
Response Time to FSB/G20
Recommendations
Distance from FSB recommendations Timeliness (years)
Notes: The values are assigned depending on whether or not (YES or NO) the element in question is present. # refers to the number of instruments, committees, institutions, and
organizational changes that were recorded. Data were collected from the BIS, the FSB, national central banks, and the IMF. Pri. = primary, Sec. = secondary, Regu. = Regulation,
and  Oth. = other, refers to how macroprudential rules and regulations are deﬁned and their location (legislation versus other). Indirect cases refers to a reference to ﬁnancial
stability  concerns that is not explicit but is mentioned indirectly. CB = central bank. Data sources are listed in the text. Also, see Table 1a.
40 D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal of Financial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49
Table  2a
Macroprudential Raw Index Values Under Different Scenarios.
Economy MaP MaP  (FSB members only)
All (No department details) All (2011 department changes) All (No department details) All (2011 department changes) All (No department
details), Weighted
Argentina 12.50 15.50 9.61 12.61 2.34
Australia 14.67 15.67 11.29 12.29 2.95
Austria 13.50 14.50 NA NA NA
Belgium 17.83 19.83 NA NA NA
Brazil 14.25 15.25 12.14 13.14 2.66
Canada 13.83 14.83 11.48 12.48 2.69
Chile  12.50 12.50 NA NA NA
China  21.33 21.33 17.45 17.45 4.03
Colombia 9.50 10.50 NA NA NA
Czech Republic 18.42 18.42 NA NA NA
Denmark 13.50 11.50 NA NA NA
Estonia 17.00 14.00 NA NA NA
Finland 9.00 9.00 NA NA NA
France 14.50 14.50 13.00 13.00 3.30
Germany 12.92 14.92 12.77 14.77 2.68
Hungary 16.00 21.00 NA NA NA
Iceland 12.00 12.00 NA NA NA
India  18.67 22.67 15.75 19.75 3.61
Indonesia 20.92 20.92 17.23 17.23 3.82
Ireland 21.42 23.42 NA NA NA
Israel  10.00 10.00 NA NA NA
Italy  10.25 7.25 8.78 5.78 2.00
Japan 13.08 13.08 11.01 11.01 2.28
Korea 12.67 11.67 12.40 11.40 2.57
Malaysia 14.50 15.50 NA NA NA
Mexico 12.08 12.08 8.77 8.77 2.48
Netherlands 21.00 21.00 NA NA NA
New  Zealand 13.75 14.75 NA NA NA
Norway 10.00 12.00 NA NA NA
Peru  2.00 2.00 NA NA NA
Poland 10.00 10.00 NA NA NA
Portugal 20.08 22.08 NA NA NA
Russia 20.00 27.00 18.05 25.05 4.26
Saudi Arabia 6.50 6.50 2.62 2.62 1.04
Singapore 9.50 9.50 6.61 6.61 1.40
Slovakia 15.00 15.00 NA NA NA
Slovenia 17.75 17.75 NA NA NA
South Africa 13.50 13.50 8.62 8.62 2.27
Spain  12.50 12.50 NA NA NA
Sweden 13.33 13.33 NA NA NA
Switzerland 8.50 17.50 NA NA NA
Thailand 14.17 13.17 NA NA NA
Turkey 12.25 12.25 10.53 10.53 2.50
UK  18.08 18.08 17.33 17.33 3.25
USA  21.25 20.25 21.33 20.33 4.68
EZ  20.83 23.83 18.71 21.71 4.11
N weigh
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tote: MaP  (macroprudential) index. The correlation between the weighted and un
aP  framework. See Table 1b.
ise in the proﬁle of ﬁnancial stability within a central bank would
herefore reﬂect the increased weight and additional resources
evoted to this function. Therefore, it is natural to consider this
spect for inclusion in an index of macroprudential capacity.11
Next, as a test of the sensitivity of our indicators to a weighting
cheme, we estimate a version of the index using weights shown
n the last column of Table 1a. We  also consider versions of the
ndex where, in turn, the index either favours or penalizes cen-
ralizing authority over macroprudential policies. In the empirical
ection we consider other types of weights based on a variety of eco-
11 This part of the index is an aggregation of several governance characteristics.
hey are: the size of monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability committees, whether the
wo committees are distinct or not, any changes in the number of senior departments
n  a central bank since 2011, and whether or not a distinct ﬁnancial stability depart-
ent exists. If the answer to the last point is yes then we ask whether the department
s  at the same level in the organizational chart as the department responsible for
roviding input into monetary policy and whether the two  departments report to
he  same deputy governor or not.ted index is 0.97. Department changes refer to the Organizational Structure of the
nomic, ﬁnancial and institutional characteristics of the economies
considered.
To facilitate cross-country comparisons, Table 2a provides the
raw scores of the index while Fig. 1 normalizes index values to
range between 0 and 1. The index that includes only FSB mem-
ber economies (i.e., the G20 members) permits a focus on those
economies that have been at the forefront of reform efforts aimed at
promoting the creation of a coherent macroprudential framework.
Before describing the results in the following section, we  provide
an explanation and justiﬁcation for the categories listed in Table 1a.
The ﬁrst category of the index captures the number and availability
of macroprudential instruments and the central bank’s ability to
deploy those instruments, taking into consideration the legal basis
of this authority.
The second category captures the extent to which there is a for-
mal  understanding of the mandate for ﬁnancial system stability
and the central bank’s role in maintaining it, including whether
the macroprudential remit is explicit. For example, whether the
responsibilities are deﬁned in statute provides some indication of
D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal of Financial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49 41
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Fig. 1. Normalized Aggregate Index Values.
Note:  Top ﬁgure is based on the aggregation of the 8 categories listed in Table 1a. The bottom ﬁgure adds an indicator of the organizational changes in central banks since
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The next category considers speciﬁc areas of policy such as the
banking system and monetary policy as well as the governance of
macroprudential frameworks. The existence of a deposit insurance
12 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this variant. The problem encountered
here is reminiscent of the debate many years ago over whether it is preferable to sep-
arate ﬁnancial supervision from central banking (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995).
The  decision to separate the functions in the UK (Bank of England versus the Financial011  to the aggregate index shown in the top portion of the Figure. The data have be
o  the Eurozone. The version of the index shown here favours decentralized author
he degree to which a concern about the maintenance of ﬁnan-
ial system stability is regarded as being on an equal footing with
esponsibility for the conduct of monetary policy. This category also
ncludes the extent to which the responsibility to act is assigned
rimarily to the central bank. As previously discussed, there con-
inues to be controversy over how much responsibility the central
ank has in the macroprudential realm. Accordingly, we  create two
ersions of our index. In one it is assumed that separate authorities
orking collectively improves the capacity of the macropruden-
ial framework to deliver ﬁnancial stability. However, it must be
ecognized that for reasons discussed in the literature review, the
pposite can also be true. Therefore, we also show what happens
o the index values when, instead, giving the authority over macro-rmalized to range between 0 and 1. The shaded areas identify countries that belong
r macroprudential policies.
prudential policies to the central bank alone improves the capacity
of the macroprudential framework.12Supervisory Authority) was later seen by some as a mistake (e.g., see Whelan, 2012).
The  ‘single peak’ model adopted by the UK, following the GFC, contrasts with the twin
or  ‘multiple peaks’ approach followed in the US. Clearly, there are strong differences
of  opinion over which model works best. Interestingly, Masciandaro and Volpicella
(2016) report that a central bank that has some microprudential responsibilities is
also likely to acquire responsibility for macroprudential policies.
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(16 of 46) describe the role that macroprudential policy plays in2 D. Lombardi, P.L. Siklos / Journal
cheme, its overall structure and generosity may  well have spillover
mplications and inﬂuence the costs of maintaining ﬁnancial sys-
em stability. As a result, deposit insurance ﬁts the deﬁnition of a
acroprudential instrument.
Transparency and accountability have become the sine qua non
f best practices in the conduct of monetary policy. Similarly, one
ould expect that central banks will want to explain their stance
is-à-vis macroprudential policies and their place in the overall
esponsibilities assigned to the central bank; as well as highlight-
ng the risks to ﬁnancial stability and the sources of instability. To
o so, we quantify how intensively the central bank raises issues
urrounding the implementation of its macroprudential regime in
erbal and written form.13
The extent to which the ﬁnancial crisis altered the responsibil-
ties of central banks should be reﬂected in whether and how the
entral bank’s administrative structure has changed. This is where
entral bank governance plays an important role, especially when
nancial system stability is an additional responsibility assigned to
he central bank and listed under category 5. This may  be reﬂected
n a variety of forms, from an increase in the size or number of pol-
cy making committees to a rise in the number of departments in
he central bank. An increase in one or both of these organizational
lements is likely to reﬂect a greater capacity of the central bank to
eal with ﬁnancial stability questions.
The role a macroprudential regime plays in the central bank’s
iews about how the transmission mechanism of monetary pol-
cy functions is potentially an important ingredient in evaluating
he monetary authority’s ability to cope with ﬁnancial shocks that
hreaten the stability of the ﬁnancial system. This is represented as
ategory 6 in the index. Nevertheless, here too it must be recognized
hat central banks debate how the implementation of macropru-
ential versus policy interest rate changes inﬂuence the monetary
olicy transmission process (e.g., see Bank of England, 2015).
The ﬁnal two categories of the index (7 and 8) explicitly recog-
ize that the FSB has taken on a pivotal role in developing standards
or the implementation of macroprudential policies, as well as pro-
iding guidance about best practices in the area. Hence, we  sought
o quantify how far the economies in our sample are from fulﬁll-
ng the recommendations made by that body. Indeed, in partial
ecognition of this development, the weighted version of the index
ssigns a weight of ¼ of the total to these two  categories com-
ined. This is measured by quantifying a country’s ‘distance’ from
ully adopting FSB recommendations as well the timeliness of its
mplementation of the required changes. Recommendations that
re ignored for long periods of time are less likely to be imple-
ented and may  well degrade the quality and effectiveness of
 macroprudential regime – so the longer policy makers take to
mplement FSB recommendations the lower is the value of the
ndex. Put differently, the less aligned a country’s macroprudential
olicy framework is with the FSB’s recommendations, the lower is
he effectiveness of that macroprudential framework likely to be.
It is unlikely a priori that all of the categories are equally impor-
ant in determining the success of a macroprudential regime, so any
ttempt to attach weights to the various categories is also likely to
e somewhat ad hoc. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the
ost frequently debated questions are: the agency or institutions
ith authority over macroprudential policies, the speciﬁcs of the
13 Here we simply count the number of speeches and press releases with macro-
rudential (or a similar expression) in the title, and divide the number by 12 to
btain average monthly values for each central bank. Additionally, we  assign a value
o  the publication of a regular ﬁnancial stability report (1), if there is a macropru-
ential ‘section’ in those reports (0.5), if another authority publishes an FSR or FSR
quivalent (0.5), and if those have a macroprudential ‘section’ (0.25).ncial Stability 27 (2016) 35–49
mandate, the availability of macroprudential instruments, and the
ﬂexibility of their implementation.
Since the FSB has been given the authority to formulate a frame-
work that is intended to maintain ﬁnancial stability, it is reasonable
to place a substantial weight on its efforts. Because it is unclear how
important many of the remaining categories are, we attach equal,
but relatively lower, weights to them. However, we  attach the low-
est weight to categories 3 and 5 because deposit insurance predates
the GFC, while our knowledge of the interaction between mone-
tary and macroprudential policies is at a sufﬁciently early stage to
weight these categories below the others (e.g., Bank of England,
2015). In the results section we consider other examples of cross-
country weighting schemes using alternative macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial indicators.
4. Macroprudential indicator: performance
4.1. Macroprudential index scores
Fig. 1 displays a bar chart showing two  versions of the normal-
ized index scores. They are: (1) aggregating all of the categories (top
bar chart) and, alternatively (2), adding the impact of organizational
changes in central banks since 2011 (bottom bar chart).14 All calcu-
lations include several Eurozone economies as well as the European
Union (EU). The higher the indicator the greater the capacity of the
macroprudential framework and, at least in terms of the FSB/G20
recommendations, the more resilient the framework is for man-
aging the risks of ﬁnancial instability. As noted previously, and to
ensure comparability, the indicator shown has been normalized so
that the values range between 0 and 1.
Table 2a shows the raw scores for the index. These clearly
reﬂect, among other factors, the combined effects of the size of
their economies (e.g., with the US, the UK, and the EZ being the
largest) and the degree to which these economies are exposed to
ﬁnancial shocks (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Colombia being relatively
less exposed). Moreover, there is considerable variety in the scores
even among Eurozone economies, ranging from a low of 9 (Finland)
to a high of just over 20 (Portugal). Adding the effect of organi-
zational changes since 2011 either has no impact on the overall
score (21 of 46 economies) or raises the score (18 economies).
In most cases the changes are small but there are a few notable
exceptions (e.g., Switzerland, India) which may  reﬂect idiosyncratic
responses to the increased emphasis on ﬁnancial stability while the
slight drop in the US captures the modest attempt at decentralizing
authority following passage of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation.
Scores are slightly lower for most economies when FSB-only mem-
bers are considered and this is a reﬂection of the differences in
the speed of response to FSB reform recommendations. The cross-
country correlation between the weighted and unweighted index is
very high (0.97), an indication that the weighting scheme does not
alter considerably our interpretation of the results. Table 2b pro-
vides the raw scores for each one of the eight categories described
in Table 1a and 1b. It is interesting to note that whereas almost
all economies provide deposit insurance, only a little over a thirdthe monetary policy transmission mechanism. As noted previously,
this area is at a relatively early stage of development.
14 The year 2011 is chosen because this represents the year the BIS surveyed its
membership to obtain organizational charts. We  also performed the calculations
using changes since 2001 (not shown). The ﬁrst measure can be said to represent
capacity of sorts post-crisis while the second set of measurements reﬂects changes
since before the GFC. Although the aggregate scores are different depending on
whether we  use 2011 versus 2001 as the benchmark, the rank order of the aggre-
gates is largely unchanged. Hence, we  only discuss the results based on the 2011
calculations.
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Table 2b
Individual Categories of the Index: Raw Index Values.
Cat. 1: Implementing
Macroprudential Policy
Cat. 2:
Coordination &
Responsibility
Cat. 3: Deposit
Insurance
Cat. 4:
Transparency &
Accountability
Cat. 5:
Governance
(2001/2011)
Cat. 6: Macroprudential
Policy in the Monetary
Policy Transmission
Mechanism
Cat. 7: Distance to
FSB/G20
Macroprudential
Recommendations
Cat. 8: Response
Time
Argentina 5.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 4.89
Australia 1.00 11.50 1.00 1.17 3.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 4.38
Austria  1.00 10.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Belgium 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.83 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Brazil  5.25 7.00 1.00 0.00 16.00 4.00 0.00 0.50 2.61
Canada 0.25 10.50 1.00 1.08 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.75 3.10
Chile  0.00 10.50 1.00 1.00 −4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
China  6.25 11.50 1.00 1.58 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.75 4.63
Colombia 0.00 8.50 1.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Czech  Republic 8.00 6.50 1.00 1.92 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Denmark 1.00 10.50 1.00 1.00 −4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Estonia  4.00 10.50 1.00 1.50 −10.00 −2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Finland  1.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
France  1.00 12.00 1.00 0.50 3.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 4.50
Germany 1.00 8.00 1.00 2.92 7.00 5.00 0.00 3.00 3.14
Hungary 1.00 11.00 1.00 2.00 13.00 8.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Iceland  0.00 8.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 NA
India  4.25 11.00 1.00 2.42 14.00 6.00 0.00 0.25 3.17
Indonesia 7.25 9.50 1.00 2.17 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 4.69
Ireland  11.00 6.50 1.00 0.92 2.00 6.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Israel  0.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 −5.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Italy  1.00 6.50 1.00 1.75 −3.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.47
Japan  1.00 7.50 1.00 2.58 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.08
Korea  0.25 8.50 1.00 2.92 −1.00 −1.00 0.00 1.50 1.76
Malaysia 5.00 7.50 1.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Mexico  0.50 10.00 1.00 0.58 7.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 5.32
Netherlands 9.50 9.00 1.00 1.50 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
New  Zealand 7.00 4.00 0.00 1.75 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Norway 1.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 11.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Peru  0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Poland  0.50 7.50 1.00 1.00 6.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Portugal 10.00 8.00 1.00 1.08 8.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Russia  7.00 11.00 1.00 1.00 18.00 10.00 0.00 3.00 4.95
Saudi  Arabia 4.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.88
Singapore 3.50 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 1.75 4.64
Slovakia 7.00 5.50 1.00 1.50 −3.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Slovenia 5.00 9.50 1.00 2.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 NA
South  Africa 1.50 9.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.25 6.13
Spain  0.50 9.50 1.00 1.50 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Sweden 1.00 9.00 1.00 1.33 −4.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Switzerland 0.00 6.50 1.00 1.00 23.00 9.00 0.00 0.00 NA
Thailand 6.00 4.00 1.00 1.17 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 NA
Turkey  0.50 9.00 1.00 1.75 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 3.72
UK  5.00 7.00 1.00 3.08 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.25 4.00
USA  1.00 16.50 1.00 0.75 5.00 2.00 1.00 3.50 3.42
EZ  0.25 14.50 1.00 4.08 14.00 5.00 1.00 2.75 4.87
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Fig. 2. Benchmarking Macroprudential Policies: Select Categories, Normalized.
Note:  Distance and timeliness only for FSB member economies. Also, see Table 1a and Fig. 1. The index is normalized to range from 0 to 1. Decentralized refers to the
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bssumption that capacity is improved when the central bank is not the only insititu
ingle  authority (i.e., the central bank). See Table 1b for details. Note that no values
Fig. 1 suggests considerable diversity in the aggregate scores,
egardless of whether we exclude organizational changes in central
anks. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge. First, it is noteworthy
hat Ireland, one of the hardest-hit economies among Eurozone
ember countries in the past few years, earns an index value that
s one of the highest among the 46 economies sampled.15 A com-
arison of the top and bottom portions of the ﬁgure also reveals
hat the EU’s score exceeds that of the US, but only when organi-
ational changes at the ECB are included. In any event, differences
etween the two economies are very small. EU member countries
ave not only increased the burden of macroprudential policies on
he European Central Bank but have also given a boost to the EU in
ts oversight role in these areas.16 Finally, it is also worth noting that
ur aggregate macroprudential index is, generally speaking, related
o the size and impact of the various ﬁnancial crises since 2008.
ence, the US, the UK, and the EU have higher scores on this mea-
ure, as do several Eurozone economies (e.g., Ireland, Portugal, and
ermany) while relatively ﬁnancially unscathed economies such as
ustralia, Canada, India and Brazil display lower scores. Of course,
here are exceptions such as Korea and Japan who were, of course,
mpacted by the GFC but less so perhaps than, say, the US.
15 Because of the nature of the calculations we cannot attach statistical signiﬁcance
o  the differences. We  should also note that we considered adding Greece to the
ample but concluded that there was too little data available to permit a meaningful
omparison with the other economies in the dataset.
16 Aggregate measures based on the 2001 organizational charts of central banks
eveal quite clearly that Eurozone member country central banks have shrunk in
ize. Much of the reduction appears to have taken place before the crisis, that is,
etween 2001 and 2011.esponsible for macroprudential policies; Centralized biases the index in favour of a
signed to distance and timelines in non-FSB member economies.
Of course, aggregate measures can hide some interesting dif-
ferences that can only be understood by looking at some of the
individual categories of the index. Fig. 2 plots the normalized scores
for four select categories. The top left portion of the ﬁgure is a mea-
sure of the institutional ‘distance’ of each national macroprudential
framework relative to the FSB/G20 recommendations as of 2014.
For this reason only data for the G20 economies are shown. The
higher are the bars in this ﬁgure the smaller the distance to the FSB’s
recommendations. Hence, the US, the UK, and the EU (actually the
Eurozone or EZ), arguably the economies that were most directly
affected by the GFC, have put into place macroprudential regimes
that are closest to the ones deemed desirable by the FSB/G20. This
is likely due, at least in part, to the fact that its three largest mem-
bers, namely France, Germany and Italy, also have higher scores
than most G20 counterparts.17
Brazil, India and China all score relatively low. This could be
because these economies did not directly suffer from the GFC, as
did the larger economies in our sample. Alternatively, these same
economies do not have as well developed ﬁnancial systems or have
controls in place that have allowed them to approach conformity
with FSB/G20 recommendations at a slower pace. In contrast, the
other members of the BRICS score much higher, perhaps for the
same reason or, in Russia’s case, because centralization of authority
made it easier to accomplish the necessary reforms.
The top right hand side bar chart in Fig. 2 plots the response
time – i.e.  an index of the time taken to conform to FSB/G20 rec-
17 The detailed scores for the case where the index is improved depending on one’s
views about whether it is preferable to centralize authority with the central bank is
also included in the online appendix.
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Fig. 3. (a) Benchmarking Macroprudential Policies: Range of Normalized Index Values.
Note:  based on the max  (most capacity), min  (least capacity), and median of seven different versions of the macroprudential indicator index. They are: unweighted, share
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indicator is weighted. Of course, these observations reﬂect the fact
that many variables potentially interact with existing speciﬁcationsf  world GDP, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate regime index (coarse), Sha
nd  Eichengreen, 2014), capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), and capita
ecentralized authority over macroprudential policies.
mmendations – using 2008 as the benchmark for calculating a
easure of timeliness. Other things equal, it is assumed that a
aster response time, here a smaller value for the index, translates
nto a more effective framework for dealing with macroprudential
roblems. Response times are measured in years. Overall, the data
uggest that the economies closest to fulﬁlling the policies recom-
ended by the FSB are also the ones that have responded in a more
imely manner. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the task of build-
ng a macroprudential regulatory framework is also evident, as the
arger economies must not only deal with the added complexities
ssociated with sophisticated ﬁnancial systems but also take into
ccount the cross-border implications of their policies (e.g., the US,
he Eurozone, the UK, and China).
Turning to governance issues, namely the extent to which dif-
erent institutions are responsible, or accountable, for using the
vailable macroprudential instruments, the data bring into clear
ocus some differences (bottom left-hand bar chart), notably among
he UK, the US and the EU. The reason is that, in one interpretation,
he indicator is set up such that if all power is concentrated in the
entral bank alone, the score is lower. Alternatively, the indicator
enalizes the absence of centralization in assigning responsibility
or macroprudential policies. As a result, the UK does badly in one
iew because the Bank of England has considerable authority to
arry out all forms of macroprudential policy making. In contrast,
he US, where power is more diffused, scores better. The roles are
learly reversed when the interpretation of the governance ques-
ion changes. This is most clearly seen by comparing the UK and
he US cases. The same holds for the Eurozone when authority is
ot centralized. Most of the Eurozone economies do not stand out
ecause, since the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis erupted, author-
ty has tended to shift to the EU, the ECB, or both. Otherwise, with
 few exceptions, large cross-country differences are not apparent,
ossibly reﬂecting the fact that, on balance, policy makers adopted
ifferent forms of decentralization in the governance of macropru-
ential frameworks.gh (2004) exchange rate regime indicator, central bank transparency index (Dincer
ols indicator (Fernández et al., 2015). The version of the index shown here favours
Finally, the bottom right hand portion of Fig. 2 attempts to
measure the degree or transparency and accountability of the
macroprudential framework in each jurisdiction. According to our
index, Germany, the UK and the EU stand out as the best per-
formers. This may  suggest that frameworks which are somewhat
more centralized may  be more accountable and transparent. Corre-
spondingly, the US scores less well, perhaps because the regulations
needed to implement the Dodd-Frank reforms are not fully in place
or because the US, which emerged from the crisis earliest among
these three economies, has shown a declining appetite for contin-
ued reform as the ﬁnancial crisis has receded from view.
There is no unique way of aggregating the individual character-
istics of the index. A view of how the individual characteristics add
up to a single normalized index can also be developed using alter-
native weighting schemes based on the desired criteria. Fig. 3 gives
an idea of the range of values that such a normalized index can
take depending on which of a total of seven weighting schemes
is chosen.18 The possible weighting schemes suggested by our
analysis include: the relative size of the economies, the type of
exchange rate regime, central bank transparency, and how open
capital accounts are or the incidence of capital controls in the
economies examined. Generally, our indicators are robust in the
sense that irrespective of the weighting scheme that is used, the
relative rankings of countries are largely unaffected. For example,
the US and the Eurozone consistently possess the greatest capacity
to deploy macroprudential policies. That said, however, the results
suggest that the capacities of the BRICS economies (see Fig. 1) to
deliver macroprudential policies are highly sensitive to how the18 Since these weights are possibly less ad hoc than the ones assumed in Table 1a
we omit that case in constructing the bar chart in Fig. 3. The chart for the case where
macroprudential authority is centralized is shown in the online appendix.
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Table  3a
Credit Growth: Selected Results, Index Favouring Decentralization.
Period 1Period 2 1999–2006
2007–2013
1999–2007
2008–2013
2002–2006
2009–2014
2002–2007
2009–2014
2002–2006
2010–2014
2002–2007
2010–2014
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Credit Growth
Unweighted 25.31* 24.97* 22.33* 20.24 19.19 17.10
(12.87) (12.74) (13.10) (12.54) (12.65) (12.26)
BCrisis −1.279 −2.651 −2.415 −3.147 −2.617 −3.352
(6.260) (6.441) (6.892) (6.847) (6.911) (6.916)
Constant 4.463 4.120 4.983 4.411 6.731 6.158
(7.416) (7.479) (7.723) (7.489) (7.583) (7.431)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.064 0.060 0.048 0.041 0.036 0.031
Median 29.65** 27.56** 25.46** 21.87* 21.83* 18.25*
(13.00) (12.39) (11.99) (11.18) (11.34) (10.67)
BCrisis −2.637 −3.777 −3.977 −4.388 −3.953 −4.367
(6.057) (6.298) (6.887) (6.904) (6.929) (6.983)
Constant 5.770 6.175 6.665 6.468 8.197 8.000
(6.395) (6.007) (5.572) (5.185) (5.297) (5.011)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.097 0.080 0.065 0.051 0.049 0.036
Maximum 48.11*** 49.06** 45.12** 41.92* 40.27* 37.07
(16.79) (18.40) (21.68) (22.01) (21.57) (22.11)
BCrisis −2.279 −3.750 −3.729 −4.417 −3.861 −4.551
(5.903) (6.199) (7.017) (7.081) (7.096) (7.208)
Constant −14.13 −15.33 −13.13 −12.71 −9.865 −9.449
(11.50) (12.79) (14.97) (15.28) (14.97) (15.40)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.111 0.100 0.090 0.079
Minimum −11.75 −10.28 −8.351 −6.951 −8.850 −7.454
(12.43) (12.55) (13.78) (13.18) (13.58) (13.03)
BCrisis 1.251 −0.172 −0.149 −1.102 −0.643 −1.600
(6.194) (6.249) (6.507) (6.367) (6.439) (6.355)
Constant 20.00*** 19.36*** 18.53*** 16.65*** 18.49*** 16.60***
(3.126) (2.884) (2.647) (2.397) (2.602) (2.407)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
Note: BCrisis is a banking crisis dummy  (see text). Maximum is the most favourable (i.e., highest macroprudential capacity), Minimum is the least favourable. Results chosen
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the sample considered. The variable BCrisis takes on a value of 1 if
a banking crisis is recorded otherwise the variable takes a value of
zero.20
19 For example, the US’s highest normalized index value is achieved when scores
are weighted by share of world GDP (this is also the case for the UK and Eurozone).
Similarly, Brazil, Russia and South Africa achieve their highest normalized scores
under the Shambaugh (2004) exchange rate regime indicator weighting scheme, and
India  and China score their highest normalized values when the index is unweighted.
Eq. (1) is then estimated separately using the set (denoted, ‘MAX’) of each economy’s
highest normalized value for C. The same is done using each economy’s lowest val-
ues  (‘MIN’) and median (‘MED’) values, in addition to the simple unweighted indexrom  across seven different weighting schemes (see Fig. 3 and the text). Highlighted
rowth  of domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a percent of GDP. Robus
o  the number of institutions involved in carrying out macroprudential policies (see
f macroprudential frameworks, which can impact their capacity
o deal with ﬁnancial shocks emanating from various sources.
.2. Preliminary econometric assessment
Given that in most instances the adopted framework for
eploying macroprudential instruments is a relatively recent
henomenon, it is challenging to provide a rigorous empirical
ssessment of their impact. There is limited data. However, we can
sk, in a cross-country setting, whether certain proxies for vari-
bles that are likely to be affected by the loss of ﬁnancial stability
re related to the index developed in this paper. Ideally, we would
ike to perform a kind of treatment analysis, comparing economies
ith and without macroprudential frameworks. However, such an
nalysis is complicated by the fact that several of the economies
ot directly impacted by the ﬁnancial crisis, at least in comparative
erms, have also jumped on the bandwagon of creating a macropru-
ential framework. The work of the G20, the FSB, and the resulting
emonstration effect elsewhere in the world have clearly played a
ole.
Accordingly, we perform a series of simple econometric tests.
e  estimate regressions of the following form:
Xi = a0 + b0Ci + b1BCrisisi + εi (1)
here Xi = Xi2 − Xi1 is the change in a variable proxying ﬁnan-
ial stability over periods 1 and 2 (see below), and i denotes the
conomy in question. C represents the macroprudential capacity
ndicator developed in the paper for a particular economy i. We  ﬁrsts are statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level. The dependent variable is the
dard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Decentralization refers
.
estimate Eq. (1) using the unweighted normalized version of the
index. The results are shown in Tables 3a and 3b. We also consider
Eq. (1) under the six weighted versions of the index (incorporated
in the range displayed in Fig. 3). Then, using all seven normalized
index values for each country, we collect the set of MAX, MIN, and
MEDIAN values (also shown in Fig. 3), and estimate Eq. (1) sep-
arately for each.19 This provides an idea of the sensitivity of our
results to various assumptions about the capacity of an economy
to deliver macroprudential policies.
Additionally, we  include a control for the possibility that an
economy’s preparedness may  well have been inﬂuenced according
to whether they were directly affected by a banking crisis duringscores.
20 Based on the dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2012). If an economy experienced
a  bank crisis in either of the two periods used in the regressions, the dummy was
assigned a value of 1 (otherwise = 0). The data are available from https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12163.pdf. We also estimated a version of Eq. (1)
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Table  3b
Credit Growth: Selected Results, Index Favouring Centralization.
Period 1
Period 2
1999–2006
2007–2013
1999–2007
2008–2013
2002–2006
2009–2014
2002–2007
2009–2014
2002–2006
2010–2014
2002–2007
2010–2014
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Credit Growth
Unweighted 14.89 16.44 22.96 21.09 19.48 17.61
(17.55) (16.25) (13.98) (12.62) (13.01) (11.90)
BCrisis −0.204 −1.744 −1.928 −2.726 −2.181 −2.981
(6.302) (6.495) (6.684) (6.623) (6.720) (6.703)
Constant 13.42* 12.27* 8.911 7.862 10.21* 9.155*
(7.077) (6.599) (5.804) (5.280) (5.488) (5.061)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.022 0.025 0.047 0.042 0.035 0.030
Median 24.73 25.36 30.30** 27.18** 26.09** 22.97*
(17.31) (16.08) (13.57) (12.47) (12.67) (11.85)
BCrisis −0.751 −2.202 −2.221 −2.953 −2.453 −3.188
(6.170) (6.358) (6.579) (6.534) (6.618) (6.617)
Constant 10.14 9.371 6.738 6.109 8.223 7.592
(6.643) (6.209) (5.359) (4.956) (5.097) (4.798)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.074 0.062 0.056 0.045
Maximum 19.59 22.34 30.10** 28.67** 27.54** 26.11***
(20.79) (18.10) (12.75) (10.80) (10.72) (8.809)
BCrisis 1.326 −0.0463 0.0883 −0.861 −0.445 −1.398
(6.201) (6.190) (6.285) (6.126) (6.221) (6.122)
Constant 4.106 1.445 −5.284 −5.965 −3.380 −4.070
(16.20) (14.16) (9.989) (8.542) (8.470) (7.081)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.016 0.019 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.029
Minimum 42.00** 40.03*** 39.59*** 34.49*** 34.52*** 29.43***
(16.29) (14.83) (12.08) (10.85) (11.05) (10.11)
BCrisis −1.261 −2.554 −2.688 −3.310 −2.882 −3.507
(5.726)  (5.885) (6.265) (6.244) (6.310) (6.331)
Constant 7.285 7.304 6.717* 6.378* 8.081** 7.741**
(5.225) (4.806) (3.984) (3.642) (3.800) (3.561)
Observations 45 45 43 43 43 43
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wR-squared 0.117 0.102 0.09
ote: see notes to Table 3a.
Next, we deﬁne the two periods to be considered as follows:
eriod 1 is the mean of the variables considered below for the years
999–2006 or 2002–2006, that is, the pre-crisis period. Period 2
hen ranges from 2007 to 2013 to 2010–2014, deﬁned either as the
risis sample or the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis period.21 Since
he principal aim of macroprudential policies is the maintenance of
nancial system stability, we consider several candidate variables
s a proxy for X. They are, not in order of importance, the variance of
eal GDP growth, the variance of inﬂation, an ex post measure of the
eal interest rate deﬁned as the nominal short-term government
ond yield less the average inﬂation rate in each period, differ-
nt measures of credit growth, or the variance of credit growth.
ll of these variables have appeared in the literature as potential
andidates that have systemic signiﬁcance for ﬁnancial stability.
Of all the proxies for X considered, the only ﬁnancial stability
ndicator that is consistently found to be statistically signiﬁcant
s the relationship between macroprudential capacity and credit
rowth.22 Hence, Tables 3a and 3b only show the results for the
redit growth variable. The positive sign is consistent with the
otion that a macroprudential regulatory framework with greater
here capacity (C) interacts with BCrisis. The results are essentially the same and
re  not discussed further.
21 More precisely, six separate pairs of period 1 and period 2 deﬁnitions are used,
ith period 1 being any of 1999–2006, 1999–2007, 2002–2006, or 2002–2007; and
eriod 2 being any of 2007–2013, 2008–2013, 2009–2014, or 2010–2014.
22 In Tables 3a and 3b only the case of domestic credit growth to the private sector
y  banks as a percent of GDP is shown. The same conclusions are obtained when total
omestic credit growth to GDP is used. Slightly less conclusive results are obtained
hen the growth rates of the levels of various measures of domestic credit are used.0.078 0.077 0.058
capacity is observed in economies where credit growth is rising.23
Also notable is that the banking crisis dummy  is never statistically
signiﬁcant.24
Table 3b presents the same regression results as in Table 3a.
However, the version of the index used now favours the governance
model where authority over monetary policy is centralized. The
BCrisis dummy  remains insigniﬁcant in all cases but the remaining
results are not broadly different from the ones shown in Table 3a
with one notable exception. There is now a signiﬁcant response
when considering economies’ minimum index scores. Hence, even
economies that do poorly on the macroprudential capacity scale
show improvement in response to rising credit growth. In other
words, macroprudential frameworks appear largely designed to
deal with the ﬁnancial stability challenges posed by credit.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper takes stock of the state of play in 46 economies
concerning the scope, preparedness, and governance of their
macroprudential regimes. Using data collected from central banks,
treasuries, regulatory authorities, the FSB, and the BIS, we have
constructed an index of macroprudential capacity. The index rep-
resents an aggregation of eight categories consisting of over 30
23 All results not shown are available on request. We  also considered an indicator
of  ﬁnancial system stability or ﬁnancial stress that several central banks have begun
to  publish. However, there were too few indicators available and the samples too
brief to add to the list of proxies examined.
24 These results also hold if we  interact the crisis dummy with macroprudential
capacity(not shown).
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haracteristics that policy makers regard as desirable elements of
 macroprudential regime.
Overall, we ﬁnd that economies that were the most directly
mpacted by the global ﬁnancial crisis are also the ones that have
uilt up the greatest macroprudential capacity. Of course, since
he global ﬁnancial system has not been tested as it was dur-
ng the global ﬁnancial crisis, we do not yet know for sure how
esilient these frameworks actually are to a large ﬁnancial shock.
evertheless, the illustrative econometric results presented here
o suggest that policies aimed at limiting credit growth have the
est chance of being inﬂuenced by how the macroprudential frame-
ork is designed. This is the clearest policy implication from the
onstruction of our index.
In a ﬁnancially globalized environment, one element missing
rom our analysis is an indication of how closely policy makers,
specially those in countries that belong to the G20, will be willing
o cooperate in the event of another looming global ﬁnancial crisis.
he remarkable coming together of the major economies’ policies
n 2008 did much to prevent another Great Depression. However,
hile the policies to address the crisis produced a return to a form of
nancial system stability, they did not prevent signiﬁcant economic
osts to the global economy.
Still another important element absent from our analysis is
ome indication of how macroprudential policy makers plan to
eal with the shadow banking system, which was an important
ontributor to the contagion that characterized the GFC. There is,
t present, little evidence that a fully formed strategy exists for a
egment of the ﬁnancial system that has historically been a source
f ﬁnancial crises. Until policy makers are tested, or are able to
evelop tools that can get ‘into all the cracks’ of the ﬁnancial system,
xisting macroprudential frameworks remain a ‘work in progress.’
evertheless, the sheer amount of effort devoted to dealing with
he relevant questions should be viewed as a source of optimism.
Financial and economic systems are complex: highly intercon-
ected, constantly in ﬂux and prone to instability (e.g., Minsky,
992; Stiglitz, 2010; the collection of works in Blume and Durlauf,
006). Identifying an effective macroprudential policy regime
emains a daunting task given the current state of knowledge
nd the effectiveness of a macroprudential policy framework will
epend on the speciﬁc context. Furthermore, the framework should
dapt over time as information is acquired and experience is gained.
herefore, a macroprudential policy regime should not adopt a
one-size-ﬁts-all’ approach.
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